RECENT CASES
the act has been held valid as applied to one city, should be held invalid as applied to
another, and eventually be held wholly invalid, can be remedied by a reversal on rehearing or modification or repeal by the legislature. A desirable result might be reached
by passing, and allowing to become law, an amendment incorporating a sufficient tax
increase authorization and making the act as amended subject to local option referendum. If, however, views on the undesirability of "home rule" have become so firmly
entrenched that the realities of the problem are overlooked by the court and the legislature, the municipal composition of indebtedness chapter s of the National Bankruptcy Act may have become eminently useful.
Damages-Assault-Recovery for Wrongful Revocation of License-[Australia].The plaintiff, having bought a ticket in the customary manner, was admitted as a
spectator on the defendant's land where races were being run. Shortly thereafter
employees of the defendant requested him to leave, and on his refusal to do so, put
him out, using no more force than was necessary. In an action for substantial damages
for the assault, judgment was given for the defendant. On appeal to the High Court
of Australia judgment held affirmed. By purchasing the ticket the plaintiff acquired
nothing but a license to go on the land which was revocable even though given for value.
Upon revocation of the license the plaintiff became a trespasser and could be ejected
with reasonable force. Cowell v. The Rosehill Racecourse Ltd.z
There is no doubt that the defendant's wrongful conduct gives rise to a cause of
action in favor of the plaintiff. The real problem is whether substantial damages may
be recovered for the assault or whether recovery should be limited to the price of the
ticket. The latter result, which is the one reached by the court in the instant case,
gives the manager of a place of amusement unlimited freedom to eject spectators
arbitrarily. While it is unlikely that this discretion normally would be abused-because of the common desire of proprietors to retain good will-still it is small comfort
to an individual wrongfully ejected that such things rarely happen. H-is injuries in
humiliation, loss of prestige, and even bodily harm if he resisted (and it would not be
unreasonable for him to think he had the right to do so)' might be very real. On the
other hand, perhaps absolute discretion as to whom to eject is desirable in that it
enables the manager to maintain order in his place of amusement without fear of
"strike" suits. Moreover, it would seem unreasonable to place the burden on the
proprietor to convince a jury that the ejectment had been for cause.
The case repudiates the doctrine of Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.,s a decision of the
English Court of Appeals followed in England and parts of the British Commonwealth
for over twenty years, 4 which held that a purchaser of a theater ticket acquires a
'- 5o Stat. 654 (1937); i U.S.C.A. §§ 401-404 (1937), held unconstitutional in In re Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 5 U.S.L.W. 297 (D.C. Cal., Nov. i3, 1937).
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2 See Winfield, The Law of Tort, 51 L.Q.R. 257 (1935).
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4 Cox V. Coulson, [i916] 2 K.B. 177, i86, Hubbs v. Black, 46 D.L.R. 583, 588, 594 (i918);
Heller v. Racing Ass'n, [1925]2 D.L.R. 286, 287; Winfield, 51 L.Q.R. 257 (1935); cf. the American cases, 3o A.L.R. (1924).
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right to stay for the whole performance, if he obeys the rules of the management,
and that he may recover substantial damages for assault if he is ejected without cause.
The theory of the Hurst decision was that the grant of the privilege of witnessing the
entertainment, having been purchased for valuable consideration, was irrevocable to
the extent that the proprietor by his revocation could not make the spectator a trespasser. Hurst'scase has been criticized in several leading textss as well as in the instant
case because of its apparent extension of the doctrine of the irrevocability of a license
coupled with an interest in land to a license coupled with a contract right only. However, on analogy to the doctrine in the field of agency of the irrevocability of a power
when given as security even for some interest less than an interest in the res itself,6
the license might be said to be irrevocable here, if it is felt to be a necessary security
for the licensee's contract rights. It is indeed questionable whether the defendant
should, 1y his own breach of contract, be able to make the plaintiff a trespasser and
thus legalize a subsequent invasion of the licensee's person. 7 If the fundamental reason
for allowing a landowner to eject a trespasser is the wrongful act of that trespasser,
how can we justify the ejection here when it was the owner and not the ticket holder
who was the wrongdoer?8 A distinction might well be made between the instant situation, where the ticket holder is already on the bLnd, and that where the ticket holder,
having been refused admittance, is resisted in his attempt to enter the amusement
place by force.
Substantial recovery might be given by way of consequential damages for breach
of contract. However, the courts are likely to object because of the established rule
that contract damages must be "such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as
arising naturally from the breach of contract itself or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the
contract as the probable result of a breach of it."9 In the instant case, Dixon, J.,
disapproving recovery on this ground says, "It was the plaintiff's legal duty to leave
the premises after notice that his license to remain was withdrawn, and as the assault
was the lawful consequence of his failure to do so, it could hardly be called a reasonable
and probable consequence of the defendant's breach of contract in withdrawing the
license."1o
57 Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. Law 328 (1926); Salmond, Torts 263 (8th ed. 1934); Ashburner, Principles of Equity ig(2d ed. 1923). Cf. Clark, Covenants and Interests Running
with the Land 40 (1929). "The decision in the Hurst case is to be commended for its treatment
of the contract as one entire matter not to be divided up into 'contract' and 'license.'"
61 Mechem, Agency § 576 (2d ed. 1914); Rest., Agency §§ 138, 139 (i933).
7 See Butler v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry. Co., 22 Q.B.D. 207 (i888),
where a passenger was allowed recovery in assault and battery for being ejected from a railway
train when, having lost his ticket, he refused to pay the conductor in accordance with a rule of
the company which was printed on the tickets. The court said that since the passenger was
lawfully on the premises, the railroad had no right to eject him even though he might have been
guilty of a breach of contract. The Butler case might be distinguished from the case at hand on
the ground that a railroad, being a public carrier, is subject to more stringent rules. See comment on Hurst case by Sir John Miles, 31 L.Q.R. 217, 222 (1915).,
8 See Clark, Covenants and Interests Running with the Land 39 (1929).
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Williston, Contracts § 1344 (192o); i Sutherland, Damages § 5o (3 d ed. 1903).
1056 C.L.R. 6o5, 632 (1937).

